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U
p until a few years ago, State Street
Bank was just another big bank in
Boston. But in 1998 the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals used a patent case
filed by the bank to transform the law
concerning what is patentable. Since
then, the bank’s name has been irrevocably linked
to a landmark case. Like Linda Brown of Brown v.
Board of Education fame or Ernesto Miranda, who
lent his name to the famous Miranda warning (“You
have the right to remain silent . . .”), State Street
Bank will be forever associated with a major inflec-
tion point in U.S. law.
For many in the financial services industries—
banking, investment banking, stock brokerage firms,
and the like—State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group, Inc. was a bolt from
the blue. How could patents apply to something as
amorphous as the design of a new mutual fund sys-
tem? Light bulbs, telegraphs, integrated circuits, fool-
ish gadgets like self-tipping hats, maybe, but how
could financial products be patentable?1 As my young
son might put it, what’s up with that? And more to the
point, regardless of where these new patents came
from, how would they affect the financial world?
Would they help or hurt the financial services indus-
tries in the long run? And had anyone thought this all
through before making State Street Bank a house-
hold name outside Wall Street and Boston?
This paper tackles some of these issues. My pri-
mary goal is to review what we know about innova-
tion in the financial services industries and to try to
discuss intelligently the effect patents will have. But
first, as a service to those who might still wonder
how these questions got on the agenda, I will try to
explain how the patent system got to State Street
Bank in the first place.
There are two strands to the story: (1) the sub-
versive effects of computer software and (2) the
growing fascination with intellectual property gen-
erally. I consider each in turn.
The Long and Winding Road 
to Software Patentability
F
rom the point of view of patent law, the infusion
of computer technology has completely changed
how the legal system conceptualizes financial ser-
vices. From a patent lawyer’s point of view, many
aspects of the financial services industries look like
elaborate computer software applications. Despite the
differences in climate and dress, Wall Street may as
well be Palo Alto, Berkeley, or Redmond, Washington.
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of “hide the software in the claims” culminated in a
series of claim types. I will explain one of several—
the “general purpose computer” claim.
In these claims the invention is described as a
general purpose computer, that is, one capable of
running many different programs. The claims go on
to state that this computer is configured a certain
way—configured by software as the computer runs
it, that is. Thus, to a patent lawyer, when I shut down
my Microsoft Word for Windows application and
open Microsoft Excel, I am not just moving in and out
of different computer programs. I am creating a new
computer! When I open Excel, I am reconfiguring the
hardware rather than running a new program.
Although no judge ever actually articulated it,
everyone seemed to understand that these charac-
terization games had gotten out of hand. Legal prac-
tice did not reflect underlying technological reality.
And the computer software industry had simply
gotten too big by the 1990s for the patent system to
ignore it. Throughout the 1990s there were a series
of decisions concerning software that subtly sig-
naled the beginning of the end of many of the old
games. Software qua software was no longer strictly
forbidden. By the mid-1990s, software in usable
commercial forms could be effectively patented.
Despite the sense of change, no single case had
clearly stated the end of the old regime. Then along
came State Street Bank. This case represented a
perfect opportunity to clear up any lingering doubts
about the patentable status of software. And the
Federal Circuit court took advantage, rendering the
sweeping opinion now so well known to the finan-
cial community.
From the perspective of the history sketched
here, then, State Street Bank did not come out of
the blue—far from it. The decision was the culmina-
tion of a very long digestive process. After initially
choking on software and then letting only a little bit
slip through, in disguise, the patent system finally
gave in. Financial services software just happened to
be on the menu when the Federal Circuit court got
serious about software.
The “Shifting Baseline”—or the 
Propertization of Just about Everything
I
have tried so far in this section to put business
methods in the context of the evolution of soft-
ware patent law. But an even broader change has been
taking place, one that is also important for an under-
standing of how State Street Bank came to pass.
Not too long ago, intellectual property scholars
could speak confidently of “the competitive base-
line”—the idea that property rights were a devia-
After all, one can hear the patent lawyer saying, it’s
all just software now.
Given this mindset, the patentability of financial
services is simply a subset of a larger issue: the
patentability of software. This was one of the most
troublesome and long-standing issues in patent law
for many, many years. Since the early days of the
mainframe computer business, when IBM and oth-
ers tried to get patents on software just as they
always had for adding machines and then computer
hardware, the patent system tried to grapple with
a fundamental conundrum. How could written
code—symbols on paper, basically—be a form of
technology? Was the patent system of Thomas
Jefferson, the MacCormick reaper, Orville Wright,
and Thomas Edison the proper home for a series of
written instructions to tell a machine what to do?
The tale of how the patent system stopped wor-
rying and learned to love computer software is a
long one. I will hit only the highlights here. After the
Supreme Court expressed grave doubts about the
whole enterprise in the early 1970s, software went
underground in the patent system. It reemerged
in the form of patents claiming essentially various
pieces of machinery that were assisted by com-
puters running programs (that is, software). Thus, the
famous 1980 case of Diamond v. Diehr (450 U.S.
175), which upheld the validity of a patent on a
rubber-curing machine—a machine that happened
to be assisted by a computer running software.
From 1980 until the mid-1990s, patent lawyers
pushed the envelope defined by the Diehr case.
Software was buried in patent claims. Wherever
possible, attention was directed to conventional
industrial processes that were accomplished using a
computer, and the computer just happened to run
software. As these inventions were characterized,
software was never an end in itself. Yet patent
lawyers were forced to resort to ever more creative
feats of characterization because software was in
fact increasingly separate and distinct from the
hardware it ran on. Eventually, the elaborate game
From a patent lawyer’s point of view, many
aspects of the financial services industries look
like elaborate computer software applications.1. As many readers will be aware, the State Street Bank decision actually goes well beyond financial services. The case autho-
rizes patenting of any “method of doing business” or, more precisely, removes “business methods” from the list of things that
are not patentable. In this paper I limit my discussion of State Street Bank to its impact in the industry in which it arose—
financial services. For more general observations, particularly on the knotty issues of patent quality control the case raises,
see Merges (1999).
2. Class 705 is conventionally associated with business method patents even though some relevant patents are found in other
classes. The patent at issue in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d
1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 851 (1999), the case that changed the law in this area, is in this class. See U.S.
Patent 5,193,056, “Data Processing System for Hub and Spoke Financial Services Configuration,” filed March, 11, 1991, and
issued March 9, 1993. Note the issue date—an indication that financial services innovations were finding their way into the
patent system even before the practice was explicitly blessed by the Federal Circuit court in 1998.
3 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2003
tion from commercial norms embodied in our legal
system. Patents, copyrights, and trademarks were
the exception; open access to rivals’ products was
the rule. All this has changed in recent years. As I
argued in a recent article, the principle of philoso-
pher John Locke—labor yields property—has dis-
placed the competitive baseline:
The shift that has occurred has taken place at
the deepest substratum of the field, down where
the foundational principles bump and grind
against each other. One massive construct, the
principle of the competitive baseline, has started
to give way. Under this notion, IP [intellectual
property] rights were envisioned as a rare excep-
tion. The general rule—the law’s deep default—
was open and free competition. This was always
opposed by a counterprinciple, the idea that
labor equals property. On this view, property
rights are a matter of desert: in true Lockean
fashion, property arises when you mix your effort
with the found assets of the natural world. When
seen from the perspective of laboring creators,
the proper baseline is to protect all manifesta-
tions of creativity that take more than a trivial
amount of effort. This was a powerful principle,
to be sure, but until recently not usually power-
ful enough. The great tectonic shift of recent
years has reversed this, however. Now it often
seems as though the labor-equals-property prin-
ciple dominates. Increasingly, courts and legisla-
tors seem to believe that if one type of labor
deserves a property right, then others do as well.
And so all manner of intangibles meet with pro-
tection—even when, in the past, the competitive
baseline would have militated against it. (Merges
2000b, 2239–40)
The rise and fall of fashionable ideas is certainly
nothing new to the world of finance. One paper on
financial innovations is even titled “Boom and Bust
Patterns in the Adoption of Financial Innovations”
(Persons and Warther 1997). My point here is sim-
ply that these are boom times for the concept of
intellectual property. Businesspeople, the media, pol-
icymakers, and academics all seem fascinated by the
idea. It is thus no wonder that, when confronted
with a claim to property rights over some novel sub-
ject matter, a judge living in this environment is less
likely to ask “why?” and more likely to say “why
not?” This tendency is a simple fact of our world
and no doubt has some influence in cases such as
State Street Bank.
So where are we now? The table (on page 4) gives
us some idea. It presents totals for patents in class
705 of the U.S. Patent Classification system, which
is titled “Data Processing: Financial, Business
Practice, Management, or Cost/Price Determination,”
for the years 1994 through 2001.2
As with so many things, the numbers tell the
tale. Financial innovations are now patentable sub-
ject matter. Now that patents are here, the question
is, are they really necessary? To answer that, we
need to know something about how financial firms
protected their investments in innovations before
the advent of patents.
The “Appropriability Environment” of
Traditional Financial Services Industries
T
he financial services industries appear to be
highly innovative. In the area of traded secu-
rities alone, it is estimated that in the 1980–2001
period, the securities industry generated between
1,200 and 1,800 new types of securities (Tufano
2002). Innovation in securities occurs to fill gaps
in available instruments. New securities are con-
stantly being devised to shift risks in ways not
otherwise possible and to provide payoffs for out-
comes that current securities do not cover (what
financial economists call “market completeness”).
Outside of securities per se, there is no shortage
of innovations in the world of finance. New con-
tracts, new transactional technologies such as
automated teller machines, and even entire new
exchanges have all been common in the past
twenty-five years.4 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2003
For example, casual empiricism leads us to notice
that relatively large financial services providers
have been important innovators. Merrill Lynch
was the developer of the “cash management
account”; Salomon Brothers was the leader in
developing stripped Treasury securities; the
larger commercial banks led in developing and
offering “sweep” accounts, ATMs, and Internet
transactions for customers. But it would be use-
ful to have a more formal “census” of innovations
and their originators and the characteristics
of those innovators. (Frame and White 2002,
13, fn. 16)
Tufano studied the appropriability strategies of
financial innovators. He found that innovation was
indeed costly; he estimates that
Developing a new financial product requires an
investment of $50,000 to $5 million. This invest-
ment includes (a) payments for legal, accounting,
regulatory, and tax advice; (b) time spent educat-
ing issuers, investors, and traders; (c) investments
in computer systems for pricing and trading; and
(d) capital and personnel commitments to support
market-making. In addition, investment banks that
innovate typically pay $1 million annually to staff
product development groups with two to six
bankers. (Tufano 1989, 213)
Tufano finds that investment banks recoup these
investments through reduced costs in the market
for innovative financial products. The pioneer of a
new product has lower costs than its imitative rivals,
allowing it to capture a larger market share than
imitators. This large market share in turn permits
higher profits in the related secondary market for
the pioneering product—that is, there are economies
of scope. Essentially, even after imitators observe the
pioneering product and copy it, the pioneer retains
a long-term cost advantage. At the market price set
by imitating rivals, the pioneer enjoys “inframarginal
costs” and hence supracompetitive profits. Innovators
actually charge less than imitators, particularly at
first. In addition, a reputation for innovation helps
banks in other ways. For example, Tufano describes
a class of specialized, client-specific innovations
that are rarely imitated (Tufano 1989). In the market
to produce these, a reputation for innovation is of
course helpful.
This cost-advantage mechanism for appropriat-
ing innovation costs is not unknown in other sec-
tors. It seems to explain a good deal of readily copied
process innovations in certain industries, for exam-
Scholars of innovation are well aware that
intellectual property rights are not the only mech-
anism firms employ to recoup product develop-
ment investments. The general term for this issue
in the literature is “appropriability” (Teece 1986).
The empirical evidence establishes that patents
are considered essential to appropriability in only
a few industries—most notably, pharmaceuticals
and some branches of the chemical industry
(Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000). In other indus-
tries, the standard nonpatent appropriability
mechanisms include
• lead-time or “first mover” advantages,
• cospecific assets, uniquely adapted for use with
the innovation, and
• trade secrecy/tacit knowledge.
In financial services, lead-time, cospecific assets,
and trade secrecy/tacit knowledge seem to be
important. I consider each in turn.
Cost-saving lead time. In a series of highly illu-
minating studies, Peter Tufano documented the
financial innovation process. Tufano’s original paper
(1989) studied fifty-eight financial innovations
introduced between 1974 and 1986. The innova-
tions were in mortgage-backed securities, asset-
backed securities, non-equity-linked debt, equity-
linked debt, preferred stock, and equities. These
innovations were created almost exclusively by the
largest investment banks, with six banks in particu-
lar accounting for over 75 percent of “pioneering
deals” (Tufano 1989, 219). Large banks were more
dominant in innovative deals than in deals overall—
making financial innovation very much a game for
big players.
Tufano’s finding regarding the dominance of
large firms in the “innovation game” is echoed by












Number of Class 705 Patents Issued3. Investors Guaranty Fund, Ltd. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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ple. The important feature of this appropriability
mechanism for our purposes is that it does not rely
on property rights to be effective. It does not even
rely on informal methods of retaining exclusivity:
Everyone in the industry understands that “most
new products can be reverse-engineered easily and
cheaply” (Tufano 1989, 230). Indeed, rapid diffu-
sion of information about an innovation is actually a
marketing advantage for pioneering firms.
Tacit knowledge and reputational advan-
tage. A major area of financial innovation in the
past thirty years is securitization, the transmutation
of difficult-to-value assets into easily tradable secu-
rities. Securitization expert Tamar Frankel has asked
why the originators of new securitization practices
have not generally sought property rights for them.
She begins by noting the difficulty of adapting exist-
ing intellectual property categories to the protection
of unique securitization ideas. Next, she considers
some of the more subtle appropriability mecha-
nisms—tacit knowledge and reputational advantage.
Tacit knowledge can be thought of as know-how:
the highly detailed, often context-specific knowl-
edge actually required to do a complex job (Polanyi
1967). This knowledge is hard to specify (as more
than one artificial intelligence expert can testify),
even harder to write down (or “codify”), and harder
still to transfer from one person to another (Cowan,
David, and Foray 2000). Tacit knowledge is usually
therefore defined in contrast to more easily codifi-
able information. 
Frankel argues that tacit knowledge of how to
create a novel securitized asset provides a subtle
appropriability mechanism to financial innovators:
Paradoxically, “giving away” an innovation pro-
vides many monetary benefits. To begin with,
these giveaways may not be complete. Unlike
disclosure in applications for patents, disclosures
of innovations in advertising, presentations or
professional publications are not as complete
and detailed. Certain experiences, drawbacks
and danger points are likely to be omitted. Some
say that following cookbooks of famous chefs
rarely seems to produce dishes that taste as the
chefs’ dishes do. That is not necessarily done by
intentionally avoiding an important ingredient
from the recipe (although some cooks would be
tempted to do so). In a complex area with differ-
ent actors, it is difficult to transfer fully informa-
tion in such publications so that the reader can
replicate the activity without hands on guidance.
Just as the water, cooking utensils, and ingredi-
ents may not be identical to those used by the
author-chefs, so will the quality of the financial
assets, the type of clients and the legal environ-
ment of the transactor differ from those of the
innovators. These differences may produce diffi-
culties for the novices. (Frankel 1998, 271)
Frankel also provides evidence of reputational
advantages accruing to the creators of securities
innovations. In this field, lawyers who help trans-
mute illiquid assets into tradable securities make up
a small, specialized corner of the legal profession.
According to Frankel, “innovators reap the rewards
of prestige from enhancing their reputation. For
some people, these rewards may be the main dri-
ver” (Frankel 1998, 272). This is also consistent with
findings by Tufano, who recounts the bankers’ view
that innovation is the best way to advertise exper-
tise (Tufano 1989, 235).
While one case does not make a trend, a recent
trade secret case indicates that appropriability mech-
anisms other than lead time may occasionally be
important. In 1995 Morgan Stanley submitted a pro-
posal to the state of California in response to an
unusual request. The state was looking for innovative
approaches to securitizing the risks associated with
earthquake losses, an insurance market that the state
had recently entered in response to perceived market
failure in the private insurance business. Investors
Guaranty Fund, Inc. (IGF), is a small firm that spe-
cializes in coming up with securitization concepts and
helping large investment banks to implement them.
IGF claimed that Morgan Stanley’s submission to the
state was based on IGF’s “total integrated system” for
securitization of insurance risks. IGF had, it argued,
successfully employed this system in other securitiza-
tion projects in conjunction with other banks.
The trade secret suit was dismissed.3 The court
stated that the IGF system was based on public
Intellectual property rights are not the only
mechanism firms employ to recoup product
development investments. Empirical evidence
establishes that patents are considered essen-
tial to appropriability in only a few industries.6 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2003
Street territory. These comments provide helpful
insight into the perceived threat posed by the State
Street Bank decision. Thus, the Senate version of
the Congressional Record includes this entry from
Senator Charles Schumer:
The first inventor defense will provide the finan-
cial services industry with important, needed
protections in the face of the uncertainty pre-
sented by the Federal Circuit’s decision in the
State Street case. . . [T]his decision has raised
questions about what types of business methods
may now be eligible for patent protection. In the
financial services sector, this has prompted seri-
ous legal and practical concerns. It has created
doubt regarding whether or not particular busi-
ness methods used by this industry—including
processes, practices, and systems—might now
suddenly become subject to new claims under
the patent law. In terms of everyday business
practice, these types of activities were consid-
ered to be protected as trade secrets and were
not viewed as patentable material (Congressional
Record 1999b).
The identical statement was entered under the
name of Representative Jerrold Nadler (Congres-
sional Record 1999c). And a similar comment was
entered by Senator Robert Torricelli, who states that
“without this defense, financial services companies
face unfair patent-infringement suits over the use of
techniques and ideas (methods) they developed and
have used for years” (Congressional Record 1999d).
As Senator Schumer is quoted as saying, finan-
cial product innovations have traditionally been
“protected as trade secrets.” Based on what we
know, lead time and reputation might be added to
the list. The point of the legislation is to defend
these traditional mechanisms against the onslaught
of patents. Because of certain technical features of
the defense, however, it is not clear that the defense
alone will protect financial services firms from the
patents of “outsiders.” This uncertainty explains
why large Wall Street firms are at the same time
beginning to acquire some patents of their own.6
Property rights enforcement and information
sharing in “traditional” areas of innovation. One
crucial point of importance at this stage of the dis-
cussion is to note that not all property rights are
enforced. This concept is often lost on critics of
property rights, who positively thrive on presenting
and embellishing a gruesome “parade of horribles.”
With proliferating property rights, we are told, busi-
nesspeople could no longer do many things they
domain concepts and was not in fact proprietary to
IGF. The court also ruled that the system did not
confer a competitive advantage on Morgan Stanley
because the state terminated the securitization
experiment and implemented a more conventional
reinsurance scheme instead. 
Industry appropriability and the prior user
defense to patent infringement. Good evidence
exists that the financial services industry sought to
protect established appropriability practices in the
wake of State Street Bank. Financial services firms
lobbied for and obtained a limited defense to infringe-
ment that is now part of the U.S. patent statute.
Under this “prior user right,” firms that have devel-
oped and implemented secret internal methods of
doing business may not be precluded from using
them by later inventors who obtain a patent. A spe-
cial provision was required to secure this result, as
generally U.S. law disfavors a secret prior user com-
pared to a later user who files a patent application.
Prior user rights are common in other countries,
particularly in Europe. They provide a measure of
protection for firms that develop innovations but
do not wish to patent them. They insulate earlier
developers from the very expansive reach of prop-
erty rights granted to later inventors. Many com-
mentators, drawing on the empirical evidence con-
cerning the centrality of trade secret protection as
an appropriability mechanism in some industries
(Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000), have argued in
favor of a general prior user right under U.S. law.
But the actual law enacted in the wake of State
Street Bank is much more limited: It protects only
prior inventors of “a method of doing or conducting
business” from infringement liability.4
Lawyer/lobbyists for the financial services indus-
try very likely drafted this provision—a common
occurrence in intellectual property legislation, as
elsewhere.5 In addition, industry representatives
also appear to have drafted comments to be entered
into the Congressional Record under the names of
lawmakers from New York and New Jersey—Wall
Long after the advent of the property-rights
revolution in science, pure academic
research—and the open, property rights–
free exchange of information it depends
on—continues to thrive.4. 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(3) (2002). For more detail, see Merges and Duffy (2003, 172–73).
5. For a limited defense, see Merges (2000a) (reviewing literature on alternatives to rent-seeking and capture theories of lobbying).
It should also be noted that the sponsor of the bill that included what is now section 273 of the Patent Act stated that this
provision was not intended solely for the benefit of the financial services industry: “The earlier-inventor defense is important
to many small and large businesses, including financial services, software companies, and manufacturing firms—any business
that relies on innovative business processes and methods” (Congressional Record 1999a).
6. For example, in December 2002, CitiCorp had twenty-eight patents, and Merrill Lynch had twenty-six.
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are accustomed to doing. Every patent owner could
prevent everyone else from using their patented
technology. And because they could, we are told,
they would. Does this claim hold up based on what
we know about other fields where intellectual prop-
erty has arrived suddenly on the scene?
In a word, no. One example comes from academic
science. Here open exchange of research findings
was long thought to serve as a model of information
dissemination in the absence of property rights. Many
observers thought the sudden advent of patents on
the fruits of basic scientific research—particularly
in the life sciences—was sure to kill the scientific
enterprise or at least inflict a mortal wound. But it
did not. The reason was that although scientists
(and particularly the research universities that
employ them) aggressively acquire property rights,
they almost never assert them against other scien-
tists engaged in academic research. A scientist who
draws on the work of peers in doing his or her own
research follows a well-understood norm in the field:
Patents are asserted only against commercial entities.
Fellow scientists operating within the same research
community are off limits. In effect, there is an inner
circle within which property rights are mutually
waived. They are only deployed against private firms
operating in the outside circle of the corporate bio-
technology industry. Even though many academic
scientists work across both circles on a regular basis,
they recognize that property rights are appropriate
only in the outer circle. Patents are checked at the
door when a researcher enters the domain of pure
research. These circumstances are why, long after
the advent of the property-rights revolution in sci-
ence, pure academic research—and the open, prop-
erty rights–free exchange of information it depends
on—continues to thrive.
A variation on this theme involves cooperative
cross-licensing. In some industries, most notably
semiconductors, firms aggressively acquire patents.
But they are not typically asserted against commer-
cial rivals in litigation. Instead, firms cross-license
large patent portfolios. Sometimes two evenly
matched firms cross-license with no royalty pay-
ments. For technologically unequal trading pairs,
lump sum payments or ongoing royalties change
hands. In either event, patents serve as bargaining
chips in an elaborate industry scheme of informa-
tion transfer. Patents mediate, rather than obstruct,
the flow of information.
Would patents lead to continued exchange in the
financial services industries? It is hard to say. There
is some indication that little has changed in the wake
of the State Street Bank decision. Perhaps the large
firms continue to share information amongst them-
selves, banking patents only as a hedge against out-
siders’ attempts to use patents to hold up existing
firms. And lobbying for a “prior user right” excep-
tion to infringement (see the earlier discussion) hints
that financial firms’ main goal in the post-patent era is
to make the world safe for their existing practices.
So perhaps the free exchange of information about
new innovations will continue for the most part.
Past Responses to the “Patent Plague”
W
all Street’s reaction to the threat of patents
runs contrary to the simplistic theory of incen-
tives inherent in the patent system. But there are
other cases in which an industry has greeted the
introduction of patents as more of a threat than an
incentive. It may be instructive to review several of
these episodes, with the goal of determining how
serious the patent threat turned out to be and how
effective industry responses were.
Nineteenth-century railroads. The first brief
study may seem to come from far afield—temporally
and conceptually. But in many ways, the coming of
patents to the railroad industry in the nineteenth
century looks very like the post–State Street Bank
world on Wall Street. So far, financial firms have
undergone the same shock and surprise that the
railroads experienced when they first came to grips
with the disruptive effects of patents on established
routines of innovation. And Wall Street has responded
the same way, though much more quickly—with an
aggressive counterthrust to the legal system’s incur-
sion into familiar turf. As with the railroads, financial
firms have lobbied for legislation to overturn the
most damaging aspects of the new patent regime.
Indeed, judging by results, Wall Street’s response has
been more effective so far; the railroads never did
succeed in getting favorable legislation passed. By8 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2003
varieties, swept up in the fascination with rail and
steam that (then and now) seems to hold many in its
thrall. The number of patents awarded for various
aspects of railway technology grew steadily through-
out the nineteenth century (Schmookler 1967).
A modest number of outside inventions were
adopted by the railroads during this period. But the
patent system really burst into prominence when
courts began awarding huge damage awards to the
holders of patents who had sued the railroads.7 In
the wake of several much-discussed infringement
suits, patent matters rose to the highest levels of
discussion within the railroad companies. Although
the corporate response took some time to coalesce,
by the 1880s the industry was fully mobilized. Two
large industry organizations supervised and carefully
monitored the progress of important infringement
suits, including several at the Supreme Court. 
Meanwhile, a legislative response took shape.
Railroad executives lobbied hard in congressional
hearings against the extension of patents that had
been costly to the industry. Lobbying also centered on
a bill to overturn a particularly costly doctrine that
had arisen in the courts. The “doctrine of savings”
used a firm’s estimated cost savings due to the use of
a patented device as the basis of damage calculations.
In the hands of a sympathetic judge or jury, it could
lead to very expensive judgments. The industry
labored to pass a bill to overturn the doctrine—and
very nearly succeeded. But when the Supreme Court
in 1878 adopted a more favorable interpretation of
the savings doctrine, the industry finally backed off.8
Apart from an increase in lobbying expenditures,
did the introduction of patents affect the railroad
industry? In particular, did the introduction of
patents in any way slow down the course of railroad
industry development?
The answer is clearly no. Jacob Schmookler doc-
umented railroad industry investment, additions
to railroad track mileage, and stock prices for the
period 1837 until 1950. All three measures showed
robust increases throughout the nineteenth century
(Schmookler 1967, 116). Of special note is the fact
that particularly sharp increases in these measures
were recorded at the same time patents were arriv-
ing as a major force on the railroad scene (roughly,
between 1860 and 1890). Whatever the effects of
patents on the railroad industry, they did not bring
it to a halt. Of course, growth might have been even
more robust in the absence of patents. But, realisti-
cally, they did not appear to slow the development
of this industry in any significant way.
U.S. software industry. The U.S. software indus-
try voiced very similar concerns when software
contrast, the railroads slogged things out in the legal
trenches for many years before beating back the most
threatening aspects of the legal onslaught. Despite
the differences, there is much to gain in a quick
overview of the patent episode in railroad history.
To begin, there was a great deal of similarity in the
way innovation progressed in nineteenth-century
railroading and in late twentieth-century Wall Street.
Innovation in both industries was an inside job: It
was dominated by large, vertically integrated firms
(Usselman 2002). Nineteenth-century railroads not
only laid track and scheduled shipments but also
performed service on and made routine improve-
ments to locomotives, switching technology, rails, and
all other aspects of railroad technology. Moreover,
innovations diffused rapidly to rivals, and this occur-
rence was an accepted part of the business. Far from
preventing this flow of information, the chief technol-
ogy players at the major railroads saw themselves as
part of a larger, cross-firm enterprise. They shared
a common culture that included an implicit norm
regarding new techniques: I share with you, you
share with me (Usselman 2002). There was pride in
an innovation that others could use, perhaps even
some increment to firm or individual reputation. 
The “appropriability regime” was dominated by
complexity and capital constraints. Locomotive tech-
nology, for example, was simply too complex for
many firms to get into the industry. There were few
rivals around that could gain much from learning
about an innovation. New technology alone was
rarely seen as conveying a competitive advantage.
Reaping the rewards from it required access to the
wide array of cospecific assets making up a full-
service rail line. Property rights played a very small
role in such a setting.
All this began to change by the 1870s. This era saw
a host of outside inventors descending on the rail-
roads. They promoted a long series of improvements
and enhancements, some centering on safety devices
invented in response to highly publicized rail disasters.
But many came from mechanics and tinkerers of all
There was a great deal of similarity in the
way innovation progressed in nineteenth-
century railroading and in late twentieth-
century Wall Street. Innovation in both
industries was an inside job dominated by
large, vertically integrated firms.7. See, for example, Chicago & N.W. Railway Co. v. Sayles, 97 U.S. 554 555–556 (1878) (summarizing district court proceed-
ings from 1865 through 1875); In re Caewood Patent, 94 U.S. 695 (1876) (concerning patent for “swedge block” used to repair
and straighten worn railway rails).
8. Chicago & N.W. Railway Co. v. Sayles, 97 U.S. 554 (1878) (reversing lower court opinions and reining in “doctrine of savings”).
9. One piece of evidence from a theft of trade secret case involving techniques for securitization suggests that some explicit
information transfers have taken place under the rubric of trade secret licensing. See Investors Guaranty Fund, Ltd. v.
Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1998): “Plaintiff contends that five . . . banks—First Boston,
Goldman Sachs, Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette, Salomon Brothers, and JP Morgan—had received information from IGF about
its system under ‘confidentiality, proprietary, trade secrets acceptance conditions.’” The case was dismissed anyway on the
ground that the plaintiff had not adequately backed up its assertions in this respect.
10. Embodying technical information in a formal property right such as patent can significantly lower the cost of exchanging it
with another firm (Arora and Merges 2001). 
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patents became a reality in the 1980s. Cries were
heard throughout the community of computer pro-
grammers that patents would kill the goose that had
laid the golden egg of software creativity in the
United States (Merges and Duffy 2003, 196–203). A
particular concern was that software patents would
give an advantage to large firms, in particular IBM;
there was fear over the clash of a “patent culture”—
with its attendant high overhead costs—and the
freewheeling and productive culture of program-
mers who were said to write code not strictly for
profit but for technical sophistication and elegance.
A funny thing happened on the way to the
demise of the software industry. It never happened.
Standard-setting organizations ameliorated some of
the problematic effects of having multiple compo-
nents of complex software products and protocols
owned by separate firms. Several early test cases
found the courts being quite reasonable about scope
and validity issues with respect to computer software.
And most telling of all, programmers forming start-
ups found that venture capitalists placed a premium
on companies with a robust patent portfolio. So
leading-edge firms such as Inktomi moved quickly
to establish effective patent portfolios. One reading
of the history here is that software entrepreneurs
found that patents were decidedly not just for the
big guys. In any event, the industry continues to move
ahead despite—and in some cases even perhaps
because of—the advent of patent protection.
On the other hand, software patents have not
changed many of the basic features of the industry,
including the importance of “network effects” to
many of its products (Saloner and Shepard 1995).
Perhaps there is a deeper path dependency in indus-
trial development than we are aware of. An industry,
once started on a patent-free basis, establishes an
innovation path that later proves relatively impervi-
ous to the imposition of patents. Perhaps patents
overall simply do not affect the big variables of eco-
nomic life—industry structure, the basic pace of
innovation, etc.—in such an industry to any great
extent. While these are somewhat humbling thoughts
for a scholar who places the patent system at the
center of the economic universe, the historical case
studies certainly support such a view. Apart from
their role in fostering outside entry, and perhaps a
marginal but significant role in making old industries
safe for small, entrepreneurial firms, patents do not
seem to have shifted the basic parameters of inno-
vation in either railroading or software. If this pat-
tern holds true, we may predict that patents will not
significantly affect the overall structure or innova-
tiveness of the financial services industry. To sound
a Chandlerian theme: While patents may play a key
role in individual firms’ strategies, they may not have
much impact on industry structure.
Property Rights and the Market for 
Financial Technology
R
esearch on the emergence of markets for tech-
nology may have something to teach here as
well. According to this literature, active interfirm
markets for technology are increasingly popular
for a number of reasons. The major factors are
(1) increasing creativity in “mining” intellectual
assets for profit, (2) reduced fear of selling ideas to
major competitors, and (3) improving and expand-
ing know-how about how to propertize and value
intellectual assets (Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella
2001; Davis and Harrison 2001).
Viewed from the perspective of this literature,
one interesting question is what effect patents will
have on formalizing the exchange of information
about financial services innovations. In the past,
this information diffused out from innovators to
other firms in the relatively closed circle of experts
in each area.9 Now, with the advent of patents,
these innovations can be (to use the language of
economists who study information transfer) cod-
ified. Patents play a role here in helping identify
discrete units of information for transfer. They also
facilitate valuation by clearly demarcating the
boundaries of a discrete idea and by feeding into
a system of legal and technical experts who special-
ize in valuation.1010 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2003
financial innovations currently resides in large firms,
the people to staff new entrant firms will likely come
largely from the established players. We are all famil-
iar with many cases of start-up companies emerging
from the ranks of established players. The dynamic
nexus of restless entrepreneurs, venture capitalists,
and corporate lawyers is an important component of
the institutional infrastructure of Silicon Valley and
other innovation-rich regions. Established firms, con-
fronted with this reality, have responded in recent
years by saying in effect, “If you can’t beat them, join
them.” The result is a greater number of spin-offs.
Spin-offs could become an important part of the
scene in financial services for a number of reasons. In
financial services, broad expertise is required to inno-
vate, at least in some areas. So innovation begins in
many cases in large firms. In the language of appro-
priability, access to the cospecific assets of a large,
integrated firm is essential for successful innovation.
But once an innovation is made, there may be rea-
sons why a separate firm makes a better home for it.
First is the simple fact that huge, integrated firms
may not reward the development of the innovation as
directly or effectively as small, highly focused firms
do. This “incentive intensity” effect is a well-known
advantage of small start-ups. It explains why start-
ups often push more aggressively to expand applica-
tions of their basic technology into markets far afield
from the business of the parent (see the eSpeed
story on page 11). Second, in some cases rival firms
are far more likely to do business with a small sepa-
rate entity than with a division of a large integrated
rival. When a sophisticated technology-intensive
input is being supplied, the buyer may have to reveal
sensitive information about its product design or
operations. A company may be reluctant to share
this information with a direct competitor. This logic
seems to be at work at times in the chemical indus-
try, where sophisticated process technologies owing
their origins to large, integrated chemical firms are
sometimes spun off into independent start-ups
(Arora and Merges 2001).
Patents appear to play an important role in spin-
offs in some industries such as specialty chemicals
(Arora and Merges 2001). Without patents, the risk
that the technology will be copied by the spin-off
firm’s customers is too high. While trade secrecy is
a common appropriability mechanism for established
chemical firms, spin-offs by definition lack the cospe-
cific assets necessary for a trade secret–oriented
strategy to be effective. The only answer is to have
strong patent protection.
Is this model possible in financial services? Much
depends on the extent to which independent firms
Patents can therefore push information exchange
from an informal basis to a more formal one. Whether
this is beneficial depends on the number of transac-
tions that result under each of the two regimes.
Currently, information about financial services
innovations diffuses rapidly—through informal
contacts among the principal designers of innova-
tions, trade press articles, simple observation of
what competitors are doing, etc. These information
exchanges are easy to miss as they involve essen-
tially zero transaction costs. Every time a busi-
nessperson learns something about a competitor’s
new practice in some area, after all, information has
been transmitted. 
What happens when information such as this is
propertized—when an intellectual property right
(IPR) attaches to it? Total transactional volume
may well be affected. But how?
If a sizable proportion of the information is sud-
denly covered by a property right, the flow of infor-
mation may well decrease at first. What had been
essentially free is suddenly more costly; informa-
tion acquirers move up their demand curves. Over
time, however, a number of offsetting gains might
compensate for or justify this additional cost. A
bedrock assumption of the intellectual property
system is that certain information will not be pro-
duced without the special incentive of a property
right. Thus, the addition of property rights to the
equation will—in theory at least—call forth new
and greater creative efforts, resulting in a larger
number of innovations. True, some transactions
that would have been free will now cost more. But
the conventional wisdom from inside the IP system
would predict a net increase in innovations. To put
it bluntly, there is a possibility that while free
transfer of ideas to competitors will end, a robust
market in the formal exchange of new financial
innovation ideas will lead to more exchanges of
more valuable information.
Spin-offs. A related possibility involves spin-offs.
Because much of the know-how associated with
Apart from their role in fostering outside entry
and perhaps in making old industries safe for
small, entrepreneurial firms, patents do not
seem to have shifted the parameters of inno-
vation in either railroading or software.11. eSpeed commenced operations on March 10, 1999, as a division of Cantor Fitzgerald Securities. In December 1999, eSpeed
was spun off from Cantor Fitzgerald in an initial public offering (see <espeed.com/about_espeed/history.html>).
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can find a market for new financial product and ser-
vice ideas. If the transaction costs are too high for
deals involving these “goods,” independent firms will
not be viable—regardless of presence or absence of
property rights. Markets for pure, disembodied ideas
are, after all, fairly rare. Another consideration is
whether independent firms can devise and develop
enough of these ideas to remain viable. Perhaps it
requires access to many operational details and
many different professionals to devise new financial
products and services. The dearth of financial idea
start-ups to date certainly suggests as much. If finan-
cial idea start-ups face the problem of a dry product
development pipeline, they will not be viable.
Perhaps the Cantor Fitzgerald spin-off eSpeed is
an indication of things to come.11 eSpeed develops
and sells pricing and trading software for various
securities markets. It started in the bond market, of
course, where Cantor Fitzgerald was and is a major
player (despite the efforts of terrorists). Building
on Cantor’s original $200 million investment in new
trading technology, eSpeed is branching out into
other markets: energy, bandwidth, futures, telephone
minutes, etc. (see www.Cantor.com). It appears that
eSpeed is serious about research and development,
according to a recent 10-K filing:
We devote substantial efforts to the develop-
ment and improvement of our electronic market-
places. We will work with our clients to identify
their specific needs and make modifications to
our software, network distribution systems and
technologies which are responsive to those needs.
We are pursuing a four-pronged approach to our
research and development efforts: (1) internal
development; (2) strategic partnering; (3) acqui-
sitions; and (4) licensing. We have approxi-
mately 150 persons involved in our internal
research and development efforts. . . . We are
continuing to develop new marketplaces and
products using our internally developed applica-
tion software having open architecture and
standards. In addition, we have forged strategic
alliances with organizations such as Sungard/
ASC and QV Trading through which we will work
to develop sophisticated, front-end trading appli-
cations and products. We expect to license prod-
ucts from and to companies. . . . (ESpeed 1999
Form 10-K, available at <www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1094831/0000889812-00-001393-
index.html> at 42).
At the same time, eSpeed is also a fairly intellectual
property–intensive firm, according to a 10-K filing:
We expect to rely primarily on patent, copyright,
trade secret and trademark laws to protect our
proprietary technology and business methods.
Our license with Cantor includes four issued
United States patents as well as rights under
domestic and foreign patent applications,
including foreign applications currently filed by
Cantor (ESpeed 1999 Form 10-K, available at
<www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1094831/000
0889812-00-001393-index.html> at 8–9).
And, to the extent the trade press can be believed,
the firm has aggressively pursued markets far distant
from Cantor’s home base of bond trading (Red
Herring 2000). Indeed, its efforts to enforce some of
its patents have brought some criticism already.
Start-ups, or “Silicon Valley comes to Wall
Street.” Peter Tufano asks whether financial ser-
vices patents will “encourage more innovation by
smaller players” (2002, 37). This section explores
the possibility that the answer might be yes—that
apart from spin-offs, true start-ups may become a
more common sight in financial services.
To a large extent, a long-time observer of the
patent system cannot help notice that the best jus-
tification—and sometimes, to be truthful, the only
one—for the system appears to be to promote the
financing of dynamic new entrants. The connection
between patents and venture capital financing is a
well-accepted part of Silicon Valley practice,
though economists are just now taking at a stab at
explaining why (Gans and Stern 2002; Hellmann
and Puri 2000).
Scholars operating in the tradition of Joseph
Schumpeter have made connections between entry
by start-up firms, patent protection, and industry
structure and competition. Just as Merges and Nelson
(1990) argue that multiple, rivalrous sources of inno-
vation often promote faster economic growth, Boot
and Thakor (1997) model how different institutional
structures might lead to different levels of innovation.
They predict less innovation in a financial system
of universal banking, especially where it involves
significant market concentration. On the other hand,
where commercial and investment banking are
functionally separated, Boot and Thakor predict more
innovation. As with Merges and Nelson, the basic
idea is that competition yields increased innovation.12 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2003
2001). If this research is accurate, it suggests that
patents may influence not only the overall rate of
innovation but also the sources of innovation and,
through this, perhaps even industry structure. The
basic idea in this literature is that property rights
can make small entrants viable at the margin in set-
tings where entrants without property rights rarely
survive. Hall and Ham-Ziedonis (2001), for example,
study the emergence of small “design boutiques” in
the U.S. semiconductor industry. This industry is
characterized by very large, vertically integrated
manufacturing firms. The small entrants gain access
to necessary manufacturing assets by licensing their
designs—which is possible only in the presence of
strong patents, given the strong probability that
manufacturing firms could easily copy expensive
designs. In the language of appropriability, patents
facilitate contractual access to cospecific assets.
The general phenomenon is modeled by Arora and
Merges, who also describe a case study drawn from
the biotechnology industry. There, a supplier of
sophisticated inputs used in the manufacturing of
biotechnology products survives and thrives dealing
with customers whose expertise and know-how
would make it easy to copy its “crown jewel” tech-
nology. Again, broad patent protection is the key. 
It is impossible to say at this point whether finan-
cial services patents will permit the emergence of
similar success stories. But the fact that experi-
mentation along these lines may already be begin-
ning is intriguing. Together with the eSpeed case
study, these start-ups show that patents in the finan-
cial services industry have the potential to increase
the diversity of organizational forms available to
innovating firms in this industry.
Conclusion: Patents and the 
Ecology of Wall Street
T
o calibrate the impact of patents on financial
services with any degree of precision is not pos-
sible. There will be upheavals—patent lawsuits that
roil the industry, announced patent grants that trou-
ble industry leaders and threaten established firms
and practices, and an overall concern that patents
have changed old practices in unwelcome ways.
But beyond this, in the long haul, I will venture a
prediction: Patents will not cause any real and last-
ing problems. I offer this assessment based not on
hard empirical predictions but on two detailed his-
torical case studies, one from the nineteenth century
(the railroad industry) and one from recent times
(the software industry). I chose them because in
both industries the adjustments to patents followed
the same general pattern. And in both, early con-
It is too early for a systematic test of these con-
cepts. But some intriguing possibilities for the future
are suggested by firms exploring the start-up/
patent orientation in financial services.12
One such firm is Financial Engines, Inc., a Silicon
Valley start-up, with its headquarters in Palo Alto and
backing from a number of prominent venture capital
funds (see www.financialengines.com). Financial
Engines makes a business of providing sophisticated,
automated on-line investment advice for various
investors, typically employees of large companies
that subscribe to its services. It services dozens of
clients that employ thousands of employees. Notable
for our purposes is the fact that Financial Engines
has a patent-intensive strategy. As of fall 2002 the
firm held five U.S. patents.13 It also partners with
other firms by licensing its financial advice software
systems as components in larger investment ser-
vices packages.14
Another firm with a similar profile is FolioFN,
which permits institutional and individual investors
to put together customized investment portfolios
including fractional shares of various investment
instruments. This approach brings the benefits of
diversification to a broader market and deepens
the degree of diversification possible with a given
investment amount. The FolioFN approach is based
on a series of patents, including U.S. Patent
6,338,047, “Method and System for Investing in a
Group of Investments that Are Based on the Aggre-
gated, Individual Preference of Plural Investors,”
issued to Wallman, et al., January 8, 2002. As with
Financial Engines, the FolioFN business model
requires partnering with other firms to broaden the
business, particularly individual and institutional
investment advisers.
Patents, contracts, and the viability of start-
ups. Both start-ups described in this section plan to
rely on partnering. Recent research teaches that
patents may play a role in facilitating technology-
or information-intensive transactions such as these
(Arora and Merges 2001; Hall and Ham-Ziedonis
Research suggests that patents may influence
not only the overall rate of innovation but also
the sources of innovation and, through this,
perhaps even industry structure.12. By some accounts, start-up activity in this area appears to be on the increase. See Heaton (2000), which states, in discus-
sion of a particular start-up, that “many other financial patents are held by similarly situated start-ups and entrepreneurs.”
13. See, for example, U.S. Patent 6,125,355, “Pricing Module for Financial Advisory System,” issued to Bekaert et al. (patent
providing a single pricing module that models both fixed-income securities and equity securities into the future in an arbitrage-
free model), and U.S. Patent No. 6,292,787, issued to Scott et al., September 18, 2001, “Enhancing Utility and Diversifying
Model Risk in a Portfolio Optimization Framework.”
14. See, for example, Tom Lauricella, “State Street, Citigroup Venture to Give Advice on 401(k) Plans,” Wall Street Journal,
June 10, 2002: “For the first time, investors in some 401(k) retirement plans soon will be able to get advice to buy or sell
specific investments through the financial-services company administering their accounts. Citistreet, a joint venture of
Citigroup Inc. and State Street Corp. that is one of the largest retirement-plan providers, announced the service Monday.
Advice provided to investors in the Citistreet plans will be based on analysis and recommendations from Financial Engines
Inc., an independent investment-advisory firm.”
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cerns that patents would fundamentally undermine
innovation were proved quite wrong.
Wall Street did not need patents. It certainly did
not ask for them. Innovation was flourishing without
them. And when they came, these strange “incen-
tives” were greeted with skepticism, akin to the
Reagan-era joke, “We’re from the government. We’re
here to help.”
But now they are here. What will happen? The
early fear was that they would upset the natural
ecosystem that had evolved without them. Like a
civilization cut off from the outside world, Wall
Street would suddenly be infected with a novel
pathogen. There would be sickness where there had
been health and balance.
A patent-related epidemic may appear in Wall
Street’s future. But I doubt it. The industry-backed
prior user rights exemption was an early inoculation.
And the industry immune system is less likely to be
surprised now: Firms are more aware that they need
to be vigilant in watching what issues from the Patent
Office and in acquiring some defensive patents of
their own. Some high-profile patent infringement
lawsuits will probably be filed, but a wholesale blind-
side of the industry appears less and less likely.
At the same time, some unintended benefits
may flow in the wake of patents. Perhaps a few
new entrants will be viable that would not have
been. Perhaps patents will call forth some extra
efforts at innovating in some sectors. Stranger
things have happened.
Even if not much good comes of it, Wall Street
ought to pause before criticizing the advent of
patents. Perhaps in an ideal world, policymakers
would have studied the financial services industry
carefully for a decade before extending patent pro-
tection to financial innovations. Hearings would
have been held, fact-finding missions conducted. No
surprises would have been sprung on an unsuspect-
ing industry by an outsider court with no Wall Street
bona fides. The whole exercise would have been
much more rational, premeditated, and predictable.
But, as the State Street Bank decision demon-
strates, that’s not how it works in our system.
Because our judges are totally independent, they
did not have to worry about upsetting Wall Street.
And the separation-of-powers principle enshrined
in our Constitution means that the Federal Circuit
court did not need Congress’s permission or the
president’s blessing to throw a monkey wrench into
the operations of a major U.S. industry. The court
followed the logic of its own area of expertise and in
so doing upset received practices and conventional
wisdom. Meanwhile, Congress did not have to clear
it with the court when it passed the prior user rights
exemption. This sort of institutional dialectic of
challenge and response, this series of random out-
side shocks, is often unsettling at first. Yet it gives
our economic and political system vitality, energy,
and even (am I really writing this in an academic
paper on financial services patents?) a sense of
adventure. Ecologists and students of evolution
often talk of the beneficial effects of random shocks
in the natural world. Perhaps Wall Street ought to
pause before criticizing this one. Something good
may come of it. In the meantime, old practices will
have to be examined. Implicit routines will have
to be made more explicit, received wisdom ques-
tioned. This shakeup may not be all bad. After all,
nature teaches that regular events like this are
good—that the uninvited guest is sometimes the
most interesting one of all.14 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2003
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